Clarifications about there being two necessary conditions for consciousness

We recently proposed a modification to an influential conceptual framework in consciousness science: Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal (P) consciousness and access (A) consciousness [1]. Inst…

Abstract

We recently proposed a modification to an influential conceptual framework in consciousness science: Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal (P) consciousness and access (A) consciousness [1]. Instead, we proposed that there is only one type of consciousness, requiring two necessary conditions [2]. Importantly, we did not propose a new definition of consciousness; we agree with the current consensus that it is a ‘subjective experience’ in the here and now, or ‘what it is like’ from a first-person perspective. The novelty of our proposal stems from the subtle but important shift to conceptualizing consciousness as jointly requiring two conditions. Specifically, we proposed that neural representations of ‘content’ (e.g., perceptions, thoughts, and feelings) must (i) be formatted in a particular way, and (ii) have the potential to influence what happens next (specifically including the ability to flexibly modify one’s behavior, which in adult humans also typically entails the ability to introspect and report, given certain background conditions are met). To provide a bridge between Block’s P versus A framework and ours, we referred to condition 1 as establishing ‘potentially phenomenal content’ (P-condition) and condition 2 as providing ‘minimal access’ to that content (A-condition).